The British state cannot solve complex social and economic issues

Why hazard so much on a referendum called merely to settle an internal dispute within the Conservative Party?

After all, a referendum was not the only way for David Cameron (below) to deal with internal dissent on the European Issue. He could have cracked the whip. The speed with which the anti-Brexit Tories were expelled from the party in 2019 shows that the ardently pro-Brexit group, which never numbered more than a few dozen MPs, could have been expelled much sooner. That would have saved us all from this mess.

To understand why Cameron did not do that, we need to go back in time, to the world before Brexit became a household word. In 2010, Labour, after being in office for 13 years, lost the General Election and were replaced by a shiny new centre-right coalition of the Conservatives and LibDems.

Cameron and Clegg were both Whigs, with a shared outlook and aligning policy priorities. Neither of them wanted to leave the European Union, they both knew it was a terrible idea, yet their actions would contribute to exactly that outcome. To understand why is to understand the structural failure of the British political system.

The priority for the Coalition was the imposition of austerity. For the Conservatives, this took the form of what they called the “Big Society”. The idea of strengthening the role of local and civil society institutions in promoting the common good had respectable intellectual roots. Unfortunately – and inevitably – it was distorted as it passed through the mangling hands of the Conservative Party and the British policy establishment, and emerged as a thin justification for another round of neoliberal cuts and privatisations.

Austerity was unnecessary, ideological, opportunistic and deeply damaging. It cost the UK economy a decade of lost growth, suppressing salaries even as costs continued to rise, and squeezing working families at a time when local services – libraries and swimming pools – were being closed down. The effects, particularly in northern and peripheral parts of England, where they had no devolved institutions to lessen the blow, were devastating.

The opposite policy should have been pursued: investing in regional economic development through public spending on infrastructure projects, bringing jobs and stimulating demand. We figured that out in the 1930s. Forgive the American analogy, but we got Herbert Hoover when we really needed a Franklin Roosevelt.

Genuine anti-European sentiment was still a nerdish minority hobby in the early 2010s, although it had some rich, nefarious and well-connected backers. It was only when Ukip shifted its messaging, away from technical wonkery about the Euro and towards a harder anti-immigration stance, that it was able to sweep-up the protest vote, narrowly winning the 2014 European Parliament election (with 26.6% of the vote) and pushing the Conservatives into third place (23.1% of the vote).

This might have been ridden-out, had there been a different electoral system and a different political culture. But first-past-the-post elections and the overriding imperative to hold on to power at all costs meant that the Conservatives had to shore-up their right flank before the 2015 General Election, even if that meant calling a reckless referendum.

This is why we cannot have nice things. The British political system – crudely majoritarian, bitterly adversarial and constitutionally unconstrained – surrenders good sense and good statesmanship for short-term party priorities. To win and hold power, all is gambled on a few swing voters in a few marginal middle-England constituencies. No-one else matters.

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That power is then exercised without checks and balances, without moderating and restraining institutions, without anyone able to say, “Are you sure that is wise, minister?”

The British state, as currently constituted, is incapable of solving deep, complex economic and social problems, because it cannot engage in inclusive, long-term, public-interested decision-making. Everything is done on the hoof. Every shot is taken from the hip.

The British ruling class shies away from the serious, dull business of governing well. It prefers its politics as entertainment, a knock-about sport for overgrown schoolboys.

If you are rich enough to buy your way out of the failure of public provision and to insulate yourself from the risks – if you do not have to rely on state schools, NHS hospitals, public transport or state pensions – that is fair enough. For everyone else, it is a catastrophe.

Here in Scotland, we have devolved institutions to mitigate the worst effects. Mostly this is an English problem, which England needs to solve for itself. Yet we do have to ask ourselves this question: Why would anyone want to remain in a Union with such a reckless, incompetent, unserious country? Or think we could not do better alone?